2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn Liu 79624e9373 Merge branch 'frcc-kvm' of https://git.floweytf.com/server/server-config into frcc-kvm
flake-check / flake-check (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
lint / lint (pull_request) Canceled after 0s
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Canceled after 1m14s
2026-09-13 20:19:08 -05:00
Autumn LiuandClaude Sonnet 5 949bfca6bd actually bind /dev/kvm into the container, and test it initializes
DeviceAllow= only grants cgroup permission to open a device node - it
doesn't create one, and nspawn can't mknod a device inside a user
namespace. The node needs an explicit bind from the host as well, so
both are required together.

Also add a test that actually boots qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm
(no disk, killed by timeout) and checks for "Permission denied" /
"Could not access KVM" in its output, rather than just checking the
node opens - a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the
ioctls qemu needs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dzy7tEKLCFFXD96LmR8we3
2026-09-13 20:18:24 -05:00
2 changed files with 32 additions and 13 deletions
+14 -8
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@@ -222,13 +222,15 @@ rec {
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point. : Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices` `resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths, added to the unit's : Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container at the
`DeviceAllow=`. nspawn populates a handful of privileged devices same path and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the cgroup
(`/dev/kvm`, `/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container's own `/dev` once permission alone doesn't get you a working node (nothing can `mknod` a
the cgroup allows it, and silently skips ones the host doesn't have - device inside a user namespace), and the bind alone leaves the cgroup
no `resources.fs` bind mount needed. Nodes keep their host ownership, denying `open()`, so both are needed. The bind is unconditional, so
so a consumer inside needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the device must actually exist on whatever host runs the container.
the owning gid to mean anything. Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside needs
`isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon` `isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container. : Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -295,6 +297,10 @@ rec {
+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap" + lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
) allBindMounts; ) allBindMounts;
bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts); bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
# DeviceAllow= alone only grants cgroup permission - nspawn can't
# mknod a device node inside a user namespace, so the node still
# needs an explicit bind from the host.
deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name) inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
iface iface
mac mac
@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ rec {
nixosContainer = { nixosContainer = {
inherit autoStart privateUsers; inherit autoStart privateUsers;
bindMounts = { }; bindMounts = { };
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags; extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags ++ deviceFlags;
privateNetwork = true; privateNetwork = true;
extraVeths = linkVeths; extraVeths = linkVeths;
config = config =
+18 -5
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@@ -333,15 +333,28 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"): with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items(): for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices: for dev in devices:
if server.execute(f"test -e {dev}")[0] != 0:
# host lacks the device (e.g. /dev/kvm without nested
# virtualization, as in this test's own VM) - nspawn skips
# populating it in-container, so there's nothing to check.
continue
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible # opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}")) server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(functional): /dev/kvm actually initializes, not just opens"):
# a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the ioctls qemu
# needs, so boot with no disk (never completes) and kill it - the
# failure mode this catches is qemu refusing to start at all.
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
if "/dev/kvm" not in devices:
continue
out = server.succeed(
ct_cmd(
name,
f"{TIMEOUT} 3 qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 256 -nographic -no-reboot "
">/tmp/qemu.out 2>&1; cat /tmp/qemu.out",
)
)
assert "Permission denied" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
assert "Could not access KVM" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"): with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable: for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])): for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):