Author SHA1 Message Date
Floweynt d00b1b3727 better cache management
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Successful in 8m1s
flake-check / flake-check (pull_request) Successful in 51s
lint / lint (pull_request) Successful in 1m48s
2026-09-10 19:44:52 -05:00
5 changed files with 5 additions and 86 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
API: ${{ github.api_url }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: 'nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"'
run: nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"
- name: close resolved issue
if: steps.scan.outputs.count == '0'
+1 -1
View File
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ def format_vulnix(vulns):
def vulnix(args):
paths = list(build_hosts(args.ref).values())
result = run("vulnix", "-j", "-C", *paths, capture_output=True)
result = run("vulnix", "-j", *paths, capture_output=True)
if result.returncode not in (0, 2):
print(result.stderr, file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(result.returncode)
+1 -19
View File
@@ -61,16 +61,12 @@ let
net ? { },
resources ? { },
traits ? [ ],
isolation ? { },
}:
mkContainer {
inherit name;
inherit net resources;
svc.autoStart = true;
isolation = {
inherit nixDaemon;
}
// isolation;
isolation.nixDaemon = nixDaemon;
traits = [ sshTrait ] ++ traits;
packages = with pkgs; [ tmux ] ++ packages;
miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo;
@@ -117,28 +113,14 @@ in
ssh-generic = mkSsh {
name = "ssh-generic";
net.access = [ { to = "@internet"; } ];
# /dev/kvm keeps its host ownership, so the kvm gid must not be shifted.
isolation.privateUsers = "identity";
resources = {
fs."/home/runner/data" = {
hostPath = "${data}/ssh/generic";
isReadOnly = false;
};
devices = [ "/dev/kvm" ];
mem = "16G";
cpu = 65;
};
packages = with pkgs; [ qemu_kvm ];
traits = [
{
containerConfig =
{ config, ... }:
{
users.groups.kvm.gid = config.ids.gids.kvm;
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
};
}
];
routingInfo = [
{
username = "autumn";
+2 -22
View File
@@ -221,17 +221,6 @@ rec {
`resources.fs`
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container at the
same path and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the cgroup
permission alone doesn't get you a working node (nothing can `mknod` a
device inside a user namespace), and the bind alone leaves the cgroup
denying `open()`, so both are needed. The bind is unconditional, so
the device must actually exist on whatever host runs the container.
Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside needs
`isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -281,7 +270,6 @@ rec {
cpuQuota = "${toString (cpu * 100)}%";
memoryMax = resources.mem or "512M";
bindMounts = resources.fs or { };
devices = resources.devices or [ ];
allowsNixDaemon = isolation.nixDaemon or false;
privateUsers = isolation.privateUsers or "pick";
@@ -289,7 +277,7 @@ rec {
allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts;
userModules = map mkUser (lib.concatMap (t: t.users or [ ]) traits ++ users);
allPorts = ports ++ map (p: (normalizePort p).container) hostPorts;
useIdmap = privateUsers == "pick" || (builtins.isInt privateUsers && privateUsers > 0);
useIdmap = privateUsers != "no";
bindMountExtraFlags = lib.mapAttrsToList (
mountPoint: bm:
(if bm.isReadOnly then "--bind-ro=" else "--bind=")
@@ -297,10 +285,6 @@ rec {
+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
) allBindMounts;
bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
# DeviceAllow= alone only grants cgroup permission - nspawn can't
# mknod a device node inside a user namespace, so the node still
# needs an explicit bind from the host.
deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
iface
mac
@@ -379,7 +363,6 @@ rec {
hostAddr
bindMountHostPaths
includedInTests
devices
;
bindMounts = allBindMounts;
kind = "nspawn";
@@ -387,7 +370,7 @@ rec {
nixosContainer = {
inherit autoStart privateUsers;
bindMounts = { };
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags ++ deviceFlags;
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags;
privateNetwork = true;
extraVeths = linkVeths;
config =
@@ -520,7 +503,6 @@ rec {
;
inherit needsGateway;
bindMountHostPaths = map (s: s.source) shares;
devices = [ ];
kind = "vm";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
microvmConfig = {
@@ -957,7 +939,6 @@ rec {
startLimitBurst = 5;
startLimitIntervalSec = 120;
unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = c.bindMountHostPaths;
serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = map (d: "${d} rw") c.devices;
};
# the host end of a link, for both kinds. nixos-containers only configures
@@ -1317,7 +1298,6 @@ rec {
HOST_ADDR = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.hostAddr) autoStartTestContainers)}
IFACE = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.iface) autoStartTestContainers)}
KIND = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.kind) autoStartTestContainers)}
DEVICES = ${pyDict pyList (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.devices) autoStartTestContainers)}
# only nspawn guests can be entered with nsenter; a vm has no host-side
# netns, so every probe that runs *inside* a guest is limited to these
enterable = [c for c in included if KIND[c] == "nspawn"]
-43
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
HOST_ADDR: dict[str, str] = {}
IFACE: dict[str, str] = {}
KIND: dict[str, str] = {}
DEVICES: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
EDGES: list[tuple[str, str, list[int], list[int]]] = []
SSH_KEY: str = ""
SSH_OPTS: str = ""
@@ -56,11 +55,6 @@ def container_pid(name):
return server.succeed(f"machinectl show {name} -p Leader --value").strip()
def ct_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --mount=/proc/{pid}/ns/mnt --root=/proc/{pid}/root -- {SH} -c '{cmd}'"
def net_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --net=/proc/{pid}/ns/net -- {cmd}"
@@ -329,40 +323,3 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
server.succeed("systemctl start container@nginx")
server.wait_for_unit("container@nginx.service")
internet.wait_until_succeeds(ext_connect(80), timeout=30)
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices:
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(functional): /dev/kvm actually initializes, not just opens"):
# a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the ioctls qemu
# needs, so boot with no disk (never completes) and kill it - the
# failure mode this catches is qemu refusing to start at all.
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
if "/dev/kvm" not in devices:
continue
out = server.succeed(
ct_cmd(
name,
f"{TIMEOUT} 3 qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 256 -nographic -no-reboot "
">/tmp/qemu.out 2>&1; cat /tmp/qemu.out",
)
)
assert "Permission denied" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
assert "Could not access KVM" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):
server.fail(ct_cmd(name, f"test -e {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): identity uid mapping keeps the user namespace"):
for name in (n for n, ds in DEVICES.items() if ds):
host_ns = server.succeed("readlink /proc/1/ns/user").strip()
ct_ns = server.succeed(f"readlink /proc/{container_pid(name)}/ns/user").strip()
assert host_ns != ct_ns, f"{name} shares the host user namespace"