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frcc-kvm
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a12c18386d | ||
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e8cc76844d | ||
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f9d92fc62d |
@@ -222,13 +222,15 @@ rec {
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: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
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`resources.devices`
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: Host device nodes to expose, as paths, added to the unit's
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`DeviceAllow=`. nspawn populates a handful of privileged devices
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(`/dev/kvm`, `/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container's own `/dev` once
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the cgroup allows it, and silently skips ones the host doesn't have -
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no `resources.fs` bind mount needed. Nodes keep their host ownership,
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so a consumer inside needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for
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the owning gid to mean anything.
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: Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container at the
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same path and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the cgroup
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permission alone doesn't get you a working node (nothing can `mknod` a
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device inside a user namespace), and the bind alone leaves the cgroup
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denying `open()`, so both are needed. The bind is unconditional, so
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the device must actually exist on whatever host runs the container.
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Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside needs
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`isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
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anything.
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`isolation.nixDaemon`
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: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
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@@ -295,6 +297,10 @@ rec {
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+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
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) allBindMounts;
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bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
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# DeviceAllow= alone only grants cgroup permission - nspawn can't
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# mknod a device node inside a user namespace, so the node still
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# needs an explicit bind from the host.
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deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
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inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
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iface
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mac
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@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ rec {
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nixosContainer = {
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inherit autoStart privateUsers;
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bindMounts = { };
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extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags;
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extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags ++ deviceFlags;
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privateNetwork = true;
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extraVeths = linkVeths;
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config =
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@@ -333,9 +333,28 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
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with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
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for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
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for dev in devices:
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# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
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server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
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with subtest("(functional): /dev/kvm actually initializes, not just opens"):
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# a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the ioctls qemu
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# needs, so boot with no disk (never completes) and kill it - the
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# failure mode this catches is qemu refusing to start at all.
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for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
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if "/dev/kvm" not in devices:
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continue
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out = server.succeed(
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ct_cmd(
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name,
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f"{TIMEOUT} 3 qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 256 -nographic -no-reboot "
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">/tmp/qemu.out 2>&1; cat /tmp/qemu.out",
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)
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)
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assert "Permission denied" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
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assert "Could not access KVM" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
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with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
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for name in enterable:
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for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):
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