Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn Liu 70d7eafe76 fix bug
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2026-09-11 16:16:02 -05:00
Autumn Liu a6ff6536dc update 2026-09-11 16:16:02 -05:00
1447febbaf frcc experiments (#1)
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Co-authored-by: Autumn Liu <al63244@my.utexas.edu>
Co-authored-by: Floweynt <50057682+Floweynt@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: #1
Co-authored-by: autumn <aut.tea7@gmail.com>
2026-09-11 07:31:32 +00:00
Floweynt 6b21be0088 ci: try to fix vulnix v2
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2026-09-10 23:09:49 -05:00
floweyandFloweynt 0279df6b11 cI: improve cache management (#2)
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Co-authored-by: Floweynt <50057682+Floweynt@users.noreply.github.com>
Reviewed-on: #2
2026-09-11 02:06:39 +00:00
Floweynt 3a87891486 ci: try to fix vulnix
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2026-09-10 20:18:03 -05:00
6 changed files with 68 additions and 7 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
API: ${{ github.api_url }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"
run: 'nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"'
- name: close resolved issue
if: steps.scan.outputs.count == '0'
+1 -1
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@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ def format_vulnix(vulns):
def vulnix(args):
paths = list(build_hosts(args.ref).values())
result = run("vulnix", "-j", *paths, capture_output=True)
result = run("vulnix", "-j", "-C", *paths, capture_output=True)
if result.returncode not in (0, 2):
print(result.stderr, file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(result.returncode)
+3 -4
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@@ -163,10 +163,9 @@ in
trusted-public-keys = [ "microvm.cachix.org-1:oXnBc6hRE3eX5rSYdRyMYXnfzcCxC7yKPTbZXALsqys=" ];
};
nix.gc = {
automatic = true;
dates = "daily";
options = "--delete-older-than 14d";
nix.settings = {
min-free = 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
max-free = 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024;
};
# nix.optimise.automatic = true; - doesn't work with microvm.writableStoreOverlay
+19 -1
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@@ -61,12 +61,16 @@ let
net ? { },
resources ? { },
traits ? [ ],
isolation ? { },
}:
mkContainer {
inherit name;
inherit net resources;
svc.autoStart = true;
isolation.nixDaemon = nixDaemon;
isolation = {
inherit nixDaemon;
}
// isolation;
traits = [ sshTrait ] ++ traits;
packages = with pkgs; [ tmux ] ++ packages;
miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo;
@@ -113,14 +117,28 @@ in
ssh-generic = mkSsh {
name = "ssh-generic";
net.access = [ { to = "@internet"; } ];
# /dev/kvm keeps its host ownership, so the kvm gid must not be shifted.
isolation.privateUsers = "identity";
resources = {
fs."/home/runner/data" = {
hostPath = "${data}/ssh/generic";
isReadOnly = false;
};
devices = [ "/dev/kvm" ];
mem = "16G";
cpu = 65;
};
packages = with pkgs; [ qemu_kvm ];
traits = [
{
containerConfig =
{ config, ... }:
{
users.groups.kvm.gid = config.ids.gids.kvm;
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
};
}
];
routingInfo = [
{
username = "autumn";
+14
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@@ -221,6 +221,15 @@ rec {
`resources.fs`
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths, added to the unit's
`DeviceAllow=`. nspawn populates a handful of privileged devices
(`/dev/kvm`, `/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container's own `/dev` once
the cgroup allows it, and silently skips ones the host doesn't have -
no `resources.fs` bind mount needed. Nodes keep their host ownership,
so a consumer inside needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for
the owning gid to mean anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -270,6 +279,7 @@ rec {
cpuQuota = "${toString (cpu * 100)}%";
memoryMax = resources.mem or "512M";
bindMounts = resources.fs or { };
devices = resources.devices or [ ];
allowsNixDaemon = isolation.nixDaemon or false;
privateUsers = isolation.privateUsers or "pick";
@@ -363,6 +373,7 @@ rec {
hostAddr
bindMountHostPaths
includedInTests
devices
;
bindMounts = allBindMounts;
kind = "nspawn";
@@ -503,6 +514,7 @@ rec {
;
inherit needsGateway;
bindMountHostPaths = map (s: s.source) shares;
devices = [ ];
kind = "vm";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
microvmConfig = {
@@ -939,6 +951,7 @@ rec {
startLimitBurst = 5;
startLimitIntervalSec = 120;
unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = c.bindMountHostPaths;
serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = map (d: "${d} rw") c.devices;
};
# the host end of a link, for both kinds. nixos-containers only configures
@@ -1298,6 +1311,7 @@ rec {
HOST_ADDR = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.hostAddr) autoStartTestContainers)}
IFACE = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.iface) autoStartTestContainers)}
KIND = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.kind) autoStartTestContainers)}
DEVICES = ${pyDict pyList (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.devices) autoStartTestContainers)}
# only nspawn guests can be entered with nsenter; a vm has no host-side
# netns, so every probe that runs *inside* a guest is limited to these
enterable = [c for c in included if KIND[c] == "nspawn"]
+30
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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
HOST_ADDR: dict[str, str] = {}
IFACE: dict[str, str] = {}
KIND: dict[str, str] = {}
DEVICES: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
EDGES: list[tuple[str, str, list[int], list[int]]] = []
SSH_KEY: str = ""
SSH_OPTS: str = ""
@@ -55,6 +56,11 @@ def container_pid(name):
return server.succeed(f"machinectl show {name} -p Leader --value").strip()
def ct_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --mount=/proc/{pid}/ns/mnt --root=/proc/{pid}/root -- {SH} -c '{cmd}'"
def net_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --net=/proc/{pid}/ns/net -- {cmd}"
@@ -323,3 +329,27 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
server.succeed("systemctl start container@nginx")
server.wait_for_unit("container@nginx.service")
internet.wait_until_succeeds(ext_connect(80), timeout=30)
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices:
if server.execute(f"test -e {dev}")[0] != 0:
# host lacks the device (e.g. /dev/kvm without nested
# virtualization, as in this test's own VM) - nspawn skips
# populating it in-container, so there's nothing to check.
continue
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):
server.fail(ct_cmd(name, f"test -e {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): identity uid mapping keeps the user namespace"):
for name in (n for n, ds in DEVICES.items() if ds):
host_ns = server.succeed("readlink /proc/1/ns/user").strip()
ct_ns = server.succeed(f"readlink /proc/{container_pid(name)}/ns/user").strip()
assert host_ns != ct_ns, f"{name} shares the host user namespace"