Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn Liu 49137f9c16 fix bug
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Autumn Liu 6cda214d97 Merge branch 'frcc-kvm' of https://git.floweytf.com/server/server-config into frcc-kvm 2026-09-11 15:27:56 -05:00
Autumn Liu 1bf51e9a9e update
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Autumn Liu 9721112d67 update
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Autumn Liu 3605fc36ef meow2
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Autumn Liu bb79660386 meow
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2026-09-11 01:48:02 -05:00
Autumn Liu a54cbc14bd Merge branch 'frcc-kvm' of https://git.floweytf.com/server/server-config into frcc-kvm 2026-09-11 01:47:19 -05:00
Floweynt 06ed76e5ab Merge branch 'master' into frcc-kvm
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2026-09-10 19:30:53 -05:00
Autumn Liu 096908ac39 frcc experiments
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2026-09-10 18:31:09 -05:00
Autumn Liu 33ccab9ad4 frcc experiments
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2026-09-09 17:58:14 -05:00
5 changed files with 64 additions and 50 deletions
+4
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ on:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: nix
+2 -5
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@@ -33,16 +33,13 @@ def gitea(method, path, body=None):
req.add_header("Authorization", f'token {os.environ["GH_TOKEN"]}')
if data is not None:
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
raw = resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
sys.exit(f"gitea {method} {path}: {e.code} {e.reason}\n{e.read().decode()}")
return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
def find_open_issue(label):
issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&type=issues&labels={label}")
issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&labels={label}")
return issues[0] if issues else None
@@ -239,7 +236,7 @@ def format_vulnix(vulns):
for v in vulns:
for cve in v["affected_by"]:
score = v.get("cvssv3_basescore", {}).get(cve)
desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "").replace("\n", " ").replace("|", "∣")
desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "")
if len(desc) > 120:
desc = desc[:117] + "..."
rows.append((v["pname"], v["version"], cve, score, desc))
+10 -23
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@@ -76,14 +76,6 @@ let
miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo;
};
kvmTrait = {
containerConfig =
{ pkgs, ... }:
{
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.qemu_kvm ];
};
};
in
{
ssh-admin = mkSsh {
@@ -126,32 +118,27 @@ in
ssh-generic = mkSsh {
name = "ssh-generic";
net.access = [ { to = "@internet"; } ];
# /dev/kvm keeps its host ownership, so the kvm gid must not be shifted.
isolation.privateUsers = "identity";
resources = {
fs."/home/runner/data" = {
hostPath = "${data}/ssh/generic";
isReadOnly = false;
};
devices = [ "/dev/kvm" ];
mem = "16G";
cpu = 65;
};
traits = [ kvmTrait ];
isolation.allowedDevices = [
packages = with pkgs; [ qemu_kvm ];
traits = [
{
node = "/dev/kvm";
modifier = "rw";
}
containerConfig =
{ config, ... }:
{
node = "/dev/vhost-net";
modifier = "rw";
users.groups.kvm.gid = config.ids.gids.kvm;
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
};
}
{
node = "/dev/net/tun";
modifier = "rwm";
}
];
isolation.additionalCapabilities = [
"CAP_NET_ADMIN"
"CAP_MKNOD"
];
routingInfo = [
{
+15 -19
View File
@@ -221,6 +221,15 @@ rec {
`resources.fs`
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths, added to the unit's
`DeviceAllow=`. nspawn populates a handful of privileged devices
(`/dev/kvm`, `/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container's own `/dev` once
the cgroup allows it, and silently skips ones the host doesn't have -
no `resources.fs` bind mount needed. Nodes keep their host ownership,
so a consumer inside needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for
the owning gid to mean anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -228,17 +237,6 @@ rec {
: systemd-nspawn user namespacing; see `--private-users=` in
systemd-nspawn(1). Bind mounts always go through idmapped `--bind`.
`isolation.allowedDevices`
: List of `{ node; modifier; }` host devices to grant the container's
cgroup access to; see `containers.<name>.allowedDevices` in the NixOS
manual. nspawn bind-mounts a handful of devices (`/dev/kvm`,
`/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container itself once the cgroup allows it -
this doesn't need a matching `resources.fs` bind mount.
`isolation.additionalCapabilities`
: Extra Linux capabilities granted to the container; see
`containers.<name>.additionalCapabilities` in the NixOS manual.
`miscProperties`
: Arbitrary data attached to the result. Used for cross-container discovery
via `collectContainers`.
@@ -281,10 +279,9 @@ rec {
cpuQuota = "${toString (cpu * 100)}%";
memoryMax = resources.mem or "512M";
bindMounts = resources.fs or { };
devices = resources.devices or [ ];
allowsNixDaemon = isolation.nixDaemon or false;
privateUsers = isolation.privateUsers or "pick";
allowedDevices = isolation.allowedDevices or [ ];
additionalCapabilities = isolation.additionalCapabilities or [ ];
allowInternet = hasInternetAccess access;
allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts;
@@ -376,17 +373,13 @@ rec {
hostAddr
bindMountHostPaths
includedInTests
devices
;
bindMounts = allBindMounts;
kind = "nspawn";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
nixosContainer = {
inherit
autoStart
privateUsers
allowedDevices
additionalCapabilities
;
inherit autoStart privateUsers;
bindMounts = { };
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags;
privateNetwork = true;
@@ -521,6 +514,7 @@ rec {
;
inherit needsGateway;
bindMountHostPaths = map (s: s.source) shares;
devices = [ ];
kind = "vm";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
microvmConfig = {
@@ -957,6 +951,7 @@ rec {
startLimitBurst = 5;
startLimitIntervalSec = 120;
unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = c.bindMountHostPaths;
serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = map (d: "${d} rw") c.devices;
};
# the host end of a link, for both kinds. nixos-containers only configures
@@ -1316,6 +1311,7 @@ rec {
HOST_ADDR = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.hostAddr) autoStartTestContainers)}
IFACE = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.iface) autoStartTestContainers)}
KIND = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.kind) autoStartTestContainers)}
DEVICES = ${pyDict pyList (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.devices) autoStartTestContainers)}
# only nspawn guests can be entered with nsenter; a vm has no host-side
# netns, so every probe that runs *inside* a guest is limited to these
enterable = [c for c in included if KIND[c] == "nspawn"]
+30
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
HOST_ADDR: dict[str, str] = {}
IFACE: dict[str, str] = {}
KIND: dict[str, str] = {}
DEVICES: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
EDGES: list[tuple[str, str, list[int], list[int]]] = []
SSH_KEY: str = ""
SSH_OPTS: str = ""
@@ -55,6 +56,11 @@ def container_pid(name):
return server.succeed(f"machinectl show {name} -p Leader --value").strip()
def ct_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --mount=/proc/{pid}/ns/mnt --root=/proc/{pid}/root -- {SH} -c '{cmd}'"
def net_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --net=/proc/{pid}/ns/net -- {cmd}"
@@ -323,3 +329,27 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
server.succeed("systemctl start container@nginx")
server.wait_for_unit("container@nginx.service")
internet.wait_until_succeeds(ext_connect(80), timeout=30)
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices:
if server.execute(f"test -e {dev}")[0] != 0:
# host lacks the device (e.g. /dev/kvm without nested
# virtualization, as in this test's own VM) - nspawn skips
# populating it in-container, so there's nothing to check.
continue
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):
server.fail(ct_cmd(name, f"test -e {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): identity uid mapping keeps the user namespace"):
for name in (n for n, ds in DEVICES.items() if ds):
host_ns = server.succeed("readlink /proc/1/ns/user").strip()
ct_ns = server.succeed(f"readlink /proc/{container_pid(name)}/ns/user").strip()
assert host_ns != ct_ns, f"{name} shares the host user namespace"