Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn Liu 9721112d67 update
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2026-09-11 14:43:43 -05:00
Autumn Liu 3605fc36ef meow2
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2026-09-11 02:08:07 -05:00
Autumn Liu bb79660386 meow
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2026-09-11 01:48:02 -05:00
Autumn Liu a54cbc14bd Merge branch 'frcc-kvm' of https://git.floweytf.com/server/server-config into frcc-kvm 2026-09-11 01:47:19 -05:00
Floweynt 06ed76e5ab Merge branch 'master' into frcc-kvm
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Successful in 18m18s
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2026-09-10 19:30:53 -05:00
Autumn Liu 096908ac39 frcc experiments
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2026-09-10 18:31:09 -05:00
Autumn Liu 33ccab9ad4 frcc experiments
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2026-09-09 17:58:14 -05:00
7 changed files with 65 additions and 64 deletions
+5 -1
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@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ on:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1" - cron: "0 6 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch: workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
jobs: jobs:
scan: scan:
runs-on: nix runs-on: nix
@@ -21,7 +25,7 @@ jobs:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
API: ${{ github.api_url }} API: ${{ github.api_url }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }} REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
run: 'nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"' run: nix run -L .#ci -- upsert-issue vulnix "vulnix: known vulnerabilities in system closure" "$RUNNER_TEMP/issue.md"
- name: close resolved issue - name: close resolved issue
if: steps.scan.outputs.count == '0' if: steps.scan.outputs.count == '0'
-7
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@@ -1,17 +1,10 @@
{ lib, pkgs }: { lib, pkgs }:
let
# vulnix's bundled nix-2.34 broke its own --experimental-features detection
nixConf = pkgs.writeText "ci-nix.conf" "experimental-features = nix-command flakes";
in
# tools must track ci.py's subprocess calls; nix stays ambient (uses the # tools must track ci.py's subprocess calls; nix stays ambient (uses the
# runner's own nix, not a pinned one). # runner's own nix, not a pinned one).
pkgs.writers.writePython3Bin "ci" { pkgs.writers.writePython3Bin "ci" {
flakeIgnore = [ "E501" ]; flakeIgnore = [ "E501" ];
libraries = [ pkgs.python3Packages.subprocess-tee ]; libraries = [ pkgs.python3Packages.subprocess-tee ];
makeWrapperArgs = [ makeWrapperArgs = [
"--set-default"
"NIX_USER_CONF_FILES"
(toString nixConf)
"--prefix" "--prefix"
"PATH" "PATH"
":" ":"
+5 -9
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@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ def run(*args, **kw):
def nix(*args): def nix(*args):
# tee to stderr - stdout leaks into GITHUB_OUTPUT $() captures return subprocess_tee.run(("nix", "--extra-experimental-features", "nix-command flakes", "-L", *args), check=True, text=True).stdout
return subprocess_tee.run(("nix", "--extra-experimental-features", "nix-command flakes", "-L", *args), check=True, text=True, stdout=sys.stderr).stdout
def git(*args, check=True): def git(*args, check=True):
@@ -33,16 +32,13 @@ def gitea(method, path, body=None):
req.add_header("Authorization", f'token {os.environ["GH_TOKEN"]}') req.add_header("Authorization", f'token {os.environ["GH_TOKEN"]}')
if data is not None: if data is not None:
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json") req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp: raw = resp.read()
raw = resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
sys.exit(f"gitea {method} {path}: {e.code} {e.reason}\n{e.read().decode()}")
return json.loads(raw) if raw else None return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
def find_open_issue(label): def find_open_issue(label):
issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&type=issues&labels={label}") issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&labels={label}")
return issues[0] if issues else None return issues[0] if issues else None
@@ -239,7 +235,7 @@ def format_vulnix(vulns):
for v in vulns: for v in vulns:
for cve in v["affected_by"]: for cve in v["affected_by"]:
score = v.get("cvssv3_basescore", {}).get(cve) score = v.get("cvssv3_basescore", {}).get(cve)
desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "").replace("\n", " ").replace("|", "∣") desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "")
if len(desc) > 120: if len(desc) > 120:
desc = desc[:117] + "..." desc = desc[:117] + "..."
rows.append((v["pname"], v["version"], cve, score, desc)) rows.append((v["pname"], v["version"], cve, score, desc))
+4 -3
View File
@@ -163,9 +163,10 @@ in
trusted-public-keys = [ "microvm.cachix.org-1:oXnBc6hRE3eX5rSYdRyMYXnfzcCxC7yKPTbZXALsqys=" ]; trusted-public-keys = [ "microvm.cachix.org-1:oXnBc6hRE3eX5rSYdRyMYXnfzcCxC7yKPTbZXALsqys=" ];
}; };
nix.settings = { nix.gc = {
min-free = 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; automatic = true;
max-free = 10 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024; dates = "daily";
options = "--delete-older-than 14d";
}; };
# nix.optimise.automatic = true; - doesn't work with microvm.writableStoreOverlay # nix.optimise.automatic = true; - doesn't work with microvm.writableStoreOverlay
+11 -24
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@@ -76,14 +76,6 @@ let
miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo; miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo;
}; };
kvmTrait = {
containerConfig =
{ pkgs, ... }:
{
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.qemu_kvm ];
};
};
in in
{ {
ssh-admin = mkSsh { ssh-admin = mkSsh {
@@ -126,32 +118,27 @@ in
ssh-generic = mkSsh { ssh-generic = mkSsh {
name = "ssh-generic"; name = "ssh-generic";
net.access = [ { to = "@internet"; } ]; net.access = [ { to = "@internet"; } ];
# /dev/kvm keeps its host ownership, so the kvm gid must not be shifted.
isolation.privateUsers = "identity";
resources = { resources = {
fs."/home/runner/data" = { fs."/home/runner/data" = {
hostPath = "${data}/ssh/generic"; hostPath = "${data}/ssh/generic";
isReadOnly = false; isReadOnly = false;
}; };
devices = [ "/dev/kvm" ];
mem = "16G"; mem = "16G";
cpu = 65; cpu = 65;
}; };
traits = [ kvmTrait ]; packages = with pkgs; [ qemu_kvm ];
isolation.allowedDevices = [ traits = [
{ {
node = "/dev/kvm"; containerConfig =
modifier = "rw"; { config, ... }:
{
users.groups.kvm.gid = config.ids.gids.kvm;
users.users.runner.extraGroups = [ "kvm" ];
};
} }
{
node = "/dev/vhost-net";
modifier = "rw";
}
{
node = "/dev/net/tun";
modifier = "rwm";
}
];
isolation.additionalCapabilities = [
"CAP_NET_ADMIN"
"CAP_MKNOD"
]; ];
routingInfo = [ routingInfo = [
{ {
+15 -20
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@@ -221,6 +221,13 @@ rec {
`resources.fs` `resources.fs`
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point. : Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container's `/dev`
and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the bind alone leaves the cgroup
denying `open()`. Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside
needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon` `isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container. : Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -228,17 +235,6 @@ rec {
: systemd-nspawn user namespacing; see `--private-users=` in : systemd-nspawn user namespacing; see `--private-users=` in
systemd-nspawn(1). Bind mounts always go through idmapped `--bind`. systemd-nspawn(1). Bind mounts always go through idmapped `--bind`.
`isolation.allowedDevices`
: List of `{ node; modifier; }` host devices to grant the container's
cgroup access to; see `containers.<name>.allowedDevices` in the NixOS
manual. nspawn bind-mounts a handful of devices (`/dev/kvm`,
`/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container itself once the cgroup allows it -
this doesn't need a matching `resources.fs` bind mount.
`isolation.additionalCapabilities`
: Extra Linux capabilities granted to the container; see
`containers.<name>.additionalCapabilities` in the NixOS manual.
`miscProperties` `miscProperties`
: Arbitrary data attached to the result. Used for cross-container discovery : Arbitrary data attached to the result. Used for cross-container discovery
via `collectContainers`. via `collectContainers`.
@@ -281,10 +277,9 @@ rec {
cpuQuota = "${toString (cpu * 100)}%"; cpuQuota = "${toString (cpu * 100)}%";
memoryMax = resources.mem or "512M"; memoryMax = resources.mem or "512M";
bindMounts = resources.fs or { }; bindMounts = resources.fs or { };
devices = resources.devices or [ ];
allowsNixDaemon = isolation.nixDaemon or false; allowsNixDaemon = isolation.nixDaemon or false;
privateUsers = isolation.privateUsers or "pick"; privateUsers = isolation.privateUsers or "pick";
allowedDevices = isolation.allowedDevices or [ ];
additionalCapabilities = isolation.additionalCapabilities or [ ];
allowInternet = hasInternetAccess access; allowInternet = hasInternetAccess access;
allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts; allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts;
@@ -298,6 +293,7 @@ rec {
+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap" + lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
) allBindMounts; ) allBindMounts;
bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts); bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name) inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
iface iface
mac mac
@@ -376,19 +372,15 @@ rec {
hostAddr hostAddr
bindMountHostPaths bindMountHostPaths
includedInTests includedInTests
devices
; ;
bindMounts = allBindMounts; bindMounts = allBindMounts;
kind = "nspawn"; kind = "nspawn";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties; miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
nixosContainer = { nixosContainer = {
inherit inherit autoStart privateUsers;
autoStart
privateUsers
allowedDevices
additionalCapabilities
;
bindMounts = { }; bindMounts = { };
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags; extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags ++ deviceFlags;
privateNetwork = true; privateNetwork = true;
extraVeths = linkVeths; extraVeths = linkVeths;
config = config =
@@ -521,6 +513,7 @@ rec {
; ;
inherit needsGateway; inherit needsGateway;
bindMountHostPaths = map (s: s.source) shares; bindMountHostPaths = map (s: s.source) shares;
devices = [ ];
kind = "vm"; kind = "vm";
miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties; miscProperties = flattenMiscProp self miscProperties;
microvmConfig = { microvmConfig = {
@@ -957,6 +950,7 @@ rec {
startLimitBurst = 5; startLimitBurst = 5;
startLimitIntervalSec = 120; startLimitIntervalSec = 120;
unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = c.bindMountHostPaths; unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = c.bindMountHostPaths;
serviceConfig.DeviceAllow = map (d: "${d} rw") c.devices;
}; };
# the host end of a link, for both kinds. nixos-containers only configures # the host end of a link, for both kinds. nixos-containers only configures
@@ -1316,6 +1310,7 @@ rec {
HOST_ADDR = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.hostAddr) autoStartTestContainers)} HOST_ADDR = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.hostAddr) autoStartTestContainers)}
IFACE = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.iface) autoStartTestContainers)} IFACE = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.iface) autoStartTestContainers)}
KIND = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.kind) autoStartTestContainers)} KIND = ${pyDict pyStr (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.kind) autoStartTestContainers)}
DEVICES = ${pyDict pyList (lib.mapAttrs (_: c: c.devices) autoStartTestContainers)}
# only nspawn guests can be entered with nsenter; a vm has no host-side # only nspawn guests can be entered with nsenter; a vm has no host-side
# netns, so every probe that runs *inside* a guest is limited to these # netns, so every probe that runs *inside* a guest is limited to these
enterable = [c for c in included if KIND[c] == "nspawn"] enterable = [c for c in included if KIND[c] == "nspawn"]
+25
View File
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
HOST_ADDR: dict[str, str] = {} HOST_ADDR: dict[str, str] = {}
IFACE: dict[str, str] = {} IFACE: dict[str, str] = {}
KIND: dict[str, str] = {} KIND: dict[str, str] = {}
DEVICES: dict[str, list[str]] = {}
EDGES: list[tuple[str, str, list[int], list[int]]] = [] EDGES: list[tuple[str, str, list[int], list[int]]] = []
SSH_KEY: str = "" SSH_KEY: str = ""
SSH_OPTS: str = "" SSH_OPTS: str = ""
@@ -55,6 +56,11 @@ def container_pid(name):
return server.succeed(f"machinectl show {name} -p Leader --value").strip() return server.succeed(f"machinectl show {name} -p Leader --value").strip()
def ct_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --mount=/proc/{pid}/ns/mnt --root=/proc/{pid}/root -- {SH} -c '{cmd}'"
def net_cmd(name, cmd): def net_cmd(name, cmd):
pid = container_pid(name) pid = container_pid(name)
return f"{NSENTER} --net=/proc/{pid}/ns/net -- {cmd}" return f"{NSENTER} --net=/proc/{pid}/ns/net -- {cmd}"
@@ -323,3 +329,22 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
server.succeed("systemctl start container@nginx") server.succeed("systemctl start container@nginx")
server.wait_for_unit("container@nginx.service") server.wait_for_unit("container@nginx.service")
internet.wait_until_succeeds(ext_connect(80), timeout=30) internet.wait_until_succeeds(ext_connect(80), timeout=30)
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices:
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):
server.fail(ct_cmd(name, f"test -e {dev}"))
with subtest("(isolation): identity uid mapping keeps the user namespace"):
for name in (n for n, ds in DEVICES.items() if ds):
host_ns = server.succeed("readlink /proc/1/ns/user").strip()
ct_ns = server.succeed(f"readlink /proc/{container_pid(name)}/ns/user").strip()
assert host_ns != ct_ns, f"{name} shares the host user namespace"