2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn Liu 1bf51e9a9e update
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Successful in 6m48s
flake-check / flake-check (pull_request) Failing after 2m49s
lint / lint (pull_request) Successful in 1m48s
2026-09-11 15:27:33 -05:00
Floweynt ba23f719ab ci: fix vulnix GITHUB_OUTPUT format error
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Successful in 6m30s
flake-check / flake-check (pull_request) Successful in 52s
lint / lint (pull_request) Successful in 1m50s
2026-09-11 15:25:03 -05:00
5 changed files with 14 additions and 37 deletions
+4
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@@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ on:
- cron: "0 6 * * 1" - cron: "0 6 * * 1"
workflow_dispatch: workflow_dispatch:
permissions:
contents: read
issues: write
jobs: jobs:
scan: scan:
runs-on: nix runs-on: nix
+2 -5
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@@ -33,16 +33,13 @@ def gitea(method, path, body=None):
req.add_header("Authorization", f'token {os.environ["GH_TOKEN"]}') req.add_header("Authorization", f'token {os.environ["GH_TOKEN"]}')
if data is not None: if data is not None:
req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json") req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp: with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp:
raw = resp.read() raw = resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
sys.exit(f"gitea {method} {path}: {e.code} {e.reason}\n{e.read().decode()}")
return json.loads(raw) if raw else None return json.loads(raw) if raw else None
def find_open_issue(label): def find_open_issue(label):
issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&type=issues&labels={label}") issues = gitea("GET", f"/issues?state=open&labels={label}")
return issues[0] if issues else None return issues[0] if issues else None
@@ -239,7 +236,7 @@ def format_vulnix(vulns):
for v in vulns: for v in vulns:
for cve in v["affected_by"]: for cve in v["affected_by"]:
score = v.get("cvssv3_basescore", {}).get(cve) score = v.get("cvssv3_basescore", {}).get(cve)
desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "").replace("\n", " ").replace("|", "∣") desc = v.get("description", {}).get(cve, "")
if len(desc) > 120: if len(desc) > 120:
desc = desc[:117] + "..." desc = desc[:117] + "..."
rows.append((v["pname"], v["version"], cve, score, desc)) rows.append((v["pname"], v["version"], cve, score, desc))
+1
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@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ let
packages = with pkgs; [ tmux ] ++ packages; packages = with pkgs; [ tmux ] ++ packages;
miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo; miscProperties = self._sshpiperRegister routingInfo;
}; };
in in
{ {
ssh-admin = mkSsh { ssh-admin = mkSsh {
+5 -12
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@@ -222,14 +222,10 @@ rec {
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point. : Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices` `resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container at the : Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container's `/dev`
same path and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the cgroup and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the bind alone leaves the cgroup
permission alone doesn't get you a working node (nothing can `mknod` a denying `open()`. Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside
device inside a user namespace), and the bind alone leaves the cgroup needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
denying `open()`, so both are needed. The bind is unconditional, so
the device must actually exist on whatever host runs the container.
Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside needs
`isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
anything. anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon` `isolation.nixDaemon`
@@ -289,7 +285,7 @@ rec {
allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts; allBindMounts = builtins.foldl' (acc: t: acc // (t.resources.fs or { })) { } traits // bindMounts;
userModules = map mkUser (lib.concatMap (t: t.users or [ ]) traits ++ users); userModules = map mkUser (lib.concatMap (t: t.users or [ ]) traits ++ users);
allPorts = ports ++ map (p: (normalizePort p).container) hostPorts; allPorts = ports ++ map (p: (normalizePort p).container) hostPorts;
useIdmap = privateUsers == "pick" || (builtins.isInt privateUsers && privateUsers > 0); useIdmap = privateUsers != "no";
bindMountExtraFlags = lib.mapAttrsToList ( bindMountExtraFlags = lib.mapAttrsToList (
mountPoint: bm: mountPoint: bm:
(if bm.isReadOnly then "--bind-ro=" else "--bind=") (if bm.isReadOnly then "--bind-ro=" else "--bind=")
@@ -297,9 +293,6 @@ rec {
+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap" + lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
) allBindMounts; ) allBindMounts;
bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts); bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
# DeviceAllow= alone only grants cgroup permission - nspawn can't
# mknod a device node inside a user namespace, so the node still
# needs an explicit bind from the host.
deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices; deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name) inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
iface iface
-18
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@@ -337,24 +337,6 @@ with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}")) server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(functional): /dev/kvm actually initializes, not just opens"):
# a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the ioctls qemu
# needs, so boot with no disk (never completes) and kill it - the
# failure mode this catches is qemu refusing to start at all.
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
if "/dev/kvm" not in devices:
continue
out = server.succeed(
ct_cmd(
name,
f"{TIMEOUT} 3 qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 256 -nographic -no-reboot "
">/tmp/qemu.out 2>&1; cat /tmp/qemu.out",
)
)
assert "Permission denied" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
assert "Could not access KVM" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"): with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable: for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])): for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):