3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Autumn LiuandClaude Sonnet 5 a12c18386d actually bind /dev/kvm into the container, and test it initializes
diff-pr / dix (pull_request) Successful in 6m48s
flake-check / flake-check (pull_request) Successful in 4m39s
lint / lint (pull_request) Successful in 1m47s
DeviceAllow= only grants cgroup permission to open a device node - it
doesn't create one, and nspawn can't mknod a device inside a user
namespace. The node needs an explicit bind from the host as well, so
both are required together.

Also add a test that actually boots qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm
(no disk, killed by timeout) and checks for "Permission denied" /
"Could not access KVM" in its output, rather than just checking the
node opens - a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the
ioctls qemu needs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Dzy7tEKLCFFXD96LmR8we3
2026-09-13 20:23:36 -05:00
Autumn Liu e8cc76844d fix bug 2026-09-13 20:23:36 -05:00
Autumn Liu f9d92fc62d update 2026-09-13 20:23:35 -05:00
3 changed files with 43 additions and 18 deletions
+14 -8
View File
@@ -222,13 +222,15 @@ rec {
: Bind mounts, keyed by mount point.
`resources.devices`
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths, added to the unit's
`DeviceAllow=`. nspawn populates a handful of privileged devices
(`/dev/kvm`, `/dev/net/tun`, ...) into the container's own `/dev` once
the cgroup allows it, and silently skips ones the host doesn't have -
no `resources.fs` bind mount needed. Nodes keep their host ownership,
so a consumer inside needs `isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for
the owning gid to mean anything.
: Host device nodes to expose, as paths. Bound into the container at the
same path and added to the unit's `DeviceAllow=` - the cgroup
permission alone doesn't get you a working node (nothing can `mknod` a
device inside a user namespace), and the bind alone leaves the cgroup
denying `open()`, so both are needed. The bind is unconditional, so
the device must actually exist on whatever host runs the container.
Nodes keep their host ownership, so a consumer inside needs
`isolation.privateUsers = "identity"` for the owning gid to mean
anything.
`isolation.nixDaemon`
: Whether the Nix daemon and CLI are available inside the container.
@@ -295,6 +297,10 @@ rec {
+ lib.optionalString useIdmap ":idmap"
) allBindMounts;
bindMountHostPaths = map (bm: bm.hostPath) (lib.attrValues allBindMounts);
# DeviceAllow= alone only grants cgroup permission - nspawn can't
# mknod a device node inside a user namespace, so the node still
# needs an explicit bind from the host.
deviceFlags = map (d: "--bind=${d}") devices;
inherit (deriveIdentity ifPrefix.nspawn name)
iface
mac
@@ -381,7 +387,7 @@ rec {
nixosContainer = {
inherit autoStart privateUsers;
bindMounts = { };
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags;
extraFlags = bindMountExtraFlags ++ deviceFlags;
privateNetwork = true;
extraVeths = linkVeths;
config =
Generated
+10 -10
View File
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@
"spectrum": "spectrum"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1789252264,
"narHash": "sha256-IyOsrL64VjSHJKdzvQQcgNJtrSd4/jDa7vhlFa9libM=",
"lastModified": 1786300091,
"narHash": "sha256-4UFJOVGpaYtHW5yasSv80MaJxTBYdk2zyf3jhKtt0wA=",
"owner": "microvm-nix",
"repo": "microvm.nix",
"rev": "e7e1c7aba5cb04644cfd6afe7e98cb87d76ac64f",
"rev": "71beea0076cd46dafcee97a5a2e7d00cbba5bd2f",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1789149629,
"narHash": "sha256-H6GwaZzZf+4npqv0tph94w9tZddSjFjmQrVsW0z78uk=",
"lastModified": 1786384358,
"narHash": "sha256-RzPPiWeUtuvymnpuEWsdtzli5w4kjZs49FqEs3/1u+I=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "eaad089433ca2bb662274377d33df3d0e51ef28b",
"rev": "2fcb964de67fcf60b43471c55d5d99e61a9ccb5a",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -87,11 +87,11 @@
"spectrum": {
"flake": false,
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1786032750,
"narHash": "sha256-+Ba/kIn5BjvV7PN8bWOo7RoqgTY/Yv2M7qeMf3wS2Ag=",
"lastModified": 1785761586,
"narHash": "sha256-MWOMVqJJERwjQGgRIv8d6rlEBqbLM3VZWxHkNKIIZNw=",
"ref": "refs/heads/main",
"rev": "77d2389874bb092b8dbf05ecc5b1030372e80e98",
"revCount": 1417,
"rev": "a7762d6f54b40560dd5255ce902e6e6a5d980fe9",
"revCount": 1416,
"type": "git",
"url": "https://spectrum-os.org/git/spectrum"
},
+19
View File
@@ -333,9 +333,28 @@ with subtest("(functional): published ports follow the container's lifetime"):
with subtest("(functional): declared devices are usable in-container"):
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
for dev in devices:
# opened, not stat'd: without DeviceAllow= the node is still visible
server.succeed(ct_cmd(name, f"exec 3<> {dev}"))
with subtest("(functional): /dev/kvm actually initializes, not just opens"):
# a wrong-gid or unmapped node still opens but fails the ioctls qemu
# needs, so boot with no disk (never completes) and kill it - the
# failure mode this catches is qemu refusing to start at all.
for name, devices in DEVICES.items():
if "/dev/kvm" not in devices:
continue
out = server.succeed(
ct_cmd(
name,
f"{TIMEOUT} 3 qemu-system-x86_64 -enable-kvm -m 256 -nographic -no-reboot "
">/tmp/qemu.out 2>&1; cat /tmp/qemu.out",
)
)
assert "Permission denied" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
assert "Could not access KVM" not in out, f"{name}: qemu couldn't use /dev/kvm:\n{out}"
with subtest("(isolation): devices reach only the container that declared them"):
for name in enterable:
for dev in {d for ds in DEVICES.values() for d in ds} - set(DEVICES.get(name, [])):